

## Scenario 96

### **PAKISTAN-MEMOGATE SCANDAL:**

In Pakistan, successive military regimes allegedly promoted gun culture and a militarised society; whereas the successive civil regimes of two political parties introduced corruption, nepotism and non-accountability syndromes. After being sworn in early 2008, the ruling PPP government tried to bring the military and its ISI under civilian control, but had to retreat.

In Pakistan, PPP government's tensions with the military (re)surfaced after the 2nd May 2011's killing of Osama bin Laden by US forces in Abbottabad. Some political groups called for top military officials to be sacked for failing to detect both bin Laden's presence in Pakistan and the raid by US Special Forces to kill him. These simmering anxieties spilled into the visible tensions over a memo seeking US military help to avert a possible coup in Pakistan in the wake of bin Laden's death. Since those days the PPP government opted for allowing itself to be booted out and its leaders thrown in jail; as it would wash off the stigma of bad governance, corruption and economic disaster openly felt, seen and recorded.

In ending 2011, another controversy arose in Pakistan when the Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani held an emergency meeting with the President Zardari and the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani asking them to sack their envoy in the United States Husain Haqqani.

The issue was that a memorandum was leaked by one Mansoor Ijaz, an America based Pakistani businessman, who told the *Financial Times* that he had been asked by Husain Haqqani to deliver 'a special message' to top American officials. Mr Ijaz explicitly told that:

*'Husain Haqqani, whom I have known for over 10 years, asked me to assist him in privately delivering his message to Admiral Mike Mullen. Phone and email contacts between me and Mr Haqqani in May [2011] are available with me as we finalized draft of the memorandum and awaited the boss's approval. The boss was obviously the President Zardari, I believed'.*

**Financial Times [FT] of 10<sup>th</sup> October 2011** had also observed that:

*'... Ijaz wrote that a senior Pakistani diplomat telephoned him in May, soon after Bin Laden's death, urging him to deliver a message to the White House bypassing Pakistan's military and intelligence chiefs. The president feared a military takeover was imminent and needed an American fist on his army chief's desk to end any misguided notions of a coup and fast.*

*A memo was delivered to Mullen on May 10, offering that a "new national security team" would end relations between Pakistani intelligence and Afghan militants, namely the Taliban and its Haqqani faction.'*

**CONTENTS OF MEMO:**

The memo was taken as an indirect request from President Zardari to Admiral Mike Mullen for conveying a '*strong, urgent and direct message to Gen Kayani*' demanding the two Generals [the other Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha, DG ISI] to shun the ideas of sending PPP home. The memo was allegedly delivered to Mullen a week after the Osama's raid of 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2011 and was reportedly sponsored by President Zardari who at that time feared a military takeover in Pakistan. The memo contained that:

*'Pakistan may become a sanctuary for Osama's legacy and potentially the platform for far more rapid spread of al Qaeda's brand of fanaticism and terror.*

*That an opportunity also exists for civilians to gain upper hand over the army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the Osama bin Laden matter.*

*That in the event of Washington's message to Gen Kayani, the new national security team is prepared to do the following:*

- *An independent inquiry into the bin Laden's stay in Pakistan will be ordered.*
- *The inquiry will be independent and accountable.*
- *The new team will implement the policy of either handing over those left in al Qaeda leadership or other affiliated groups on Pakistan soil. The team also gives the US military "green light" to conduct necessary operations to capture or kill them on Pakistani soil.*

- *The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government, to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program.*
- *The new team will eliminate Section S of the ISI allegedly charged with maintaining relations with the Taliban and Haqqani network.*
- *Government of Pakistan will cooperate with new national security team and Indian government to bring perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for Mumbai attacks 2008, whether outside or inside the government, including its intelligence agencies.*

The said memo contained six mutinous articles and was revealed after Admiral Mike Mullen also confirmed its existence. In addition to memo, the electronic correspondence between Husain Haqqani and Mansoor Ijaz was also made available with account of dates, time lines and about 3700 words subsequently transcribed from the cell phones for media.

Referring to **'the News' dated 18<sup>th</sup> November 2011**, see one harsh opinion here:

*'The Memo has reached The News from more than one source, both within Pakistan and from abroad, and is nothing short of being offensively repulsive, offering an alarming insight into a power - corrupt mindset willing to compromise national interest for petty personal power gains.*

*It is, arguably, a document crafted by soul-less conspirators who clearly have no shame and dignity, no national pride or respect. The originator, writer, approver and the ultimate beneficiary of the Memo all look like vicious anti - state collaborators and traitors to craft 929 words of the Confidential Memo.'*

The whole game was being played to demolish national security apparatus of Pakistan, play havoc with its nuclear assets and allowing American boots on Pakistani soil. To make an investigation the memo also invited US authorities to hand pick the investigators panel assuring that the investigation process 'will result in immediate termination of active service officers' including Gen Kayani & Gen Pasha both. Albeit, on record there were two unanimous resolutions of the national parliament, last one dated 13<sup>th</sup> May 2011, which categorically forbade any violation of Pakistan's sovereignty by a third country.

The authors of the memo also promised to bring Pakistan's nuclear assets under a "more verifiable, transparent regime". For knowing persons, this

translated into retooling the entire setup and providing unrestricted control of Pakistan's nuclear assets to United States, something that has long figured high on the US wish list. And understandably so because their only concern was to stay in power no matter how. Let the poor people pay the price.

*[Husain Haqqani was known for his anti - army ideas since long and he never hesitated to place his philosophy open in media and public deliberations. He contended that army rule had spoiled Pakistan more than politician's. (Ref: 'the News' et al)]*

The above details apparently made sure that President Zardari had yelled before Obama administration and the people of Pakistan were kept in dark. PPP's chiefs held that no secret letter was written; adding that *'Mansoor Ijaz is neither a diplomat nor part of Pakistani foreign ministry or the government.'*

However, details published in **'the News' [London] dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 2011** should be kept in mind while referring to Mansoor Ijaz's phone calls made to and received, allegedly, from Husain Haqqani and his US contact between 9-10<sup>th</sup> May 2011, when the controversial memo was prepared and sent. Mansoor Ijaz told that:

*I presented my original telephone company records to the senior Pakistani official [Gen Pasha, DG ISI] whom I met [in a London Hotel on 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2011] to verify and validate the evidence in my possession. I asked him (the official) to independently verify and check that the numbers of the individuals concerned were in fact their telephone numbers.*

*I further asked him to put the calls in sequence with both e-mail and Blackberry Messenger (BBM) messages that had been sent to the ambassador and my US contact so that he could develop a comprehensive picture of the entire set of events.*

*The data was transferred to his (DG ISI's) secure e-mail address directly from my computer, and he verified in front of me that the original telephone bills and original e-mail and BBM traffic were authentic and forensically unaltered.'*

The US businessman Mansoor Ijaz had also recalled a Blackberry Message conversation in which Mr Haqqani had stated that: *'you can keep saying you delivered a message and show BBM conversations to prove it... Basically, you don't get it.'*

Husain Haqqani, however, contended again that the said phone calls and BBM record were fake, whereas **on 11<sup>th</sup> November 2011**, he had lastly

communicated with Mansoor Ijaz saying that: *'I have just changed BBs...I may never trust you or your judgment again...'* Despite the said phrases on record Husain Haqqani told **'the Guardian'** of UK [news appeared on **17<sup>th</sup> November 2011**] that:

*'I've not written or delivered the memo, but have offered to face an inquiry in order to put an end to the matter. I do not want this non - issue of an insignificant memo written by a private individual and not considered credible by its lone recipient to undermine democracy.'*

*A spokesman for Gen Mullen, who has just retired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had this week confirmed a letter was received but added that Mullen did not find it at all credible and took no note of it then or later.*

*Pakistan's opposition has seized on the story. But, so far, there is no evidence that Zardari or his representatives [might have] authored the letter.'*

Mansoor Ijaz met the ISI Chief Gen Pasha on **22<sup>nd</sup> October 2011** and that the full data and evidence was given to him including records of phone calls, SMS messages, BBM chat exchanges, e-mails etc. The meeting, which started around 6:30pm and lasted for over four hours, took place in a Park Lane Intercontinental hotel room in London. The records were subsequently put through a verification process and the DG ISI was convinced about their authenticity.

After his [DG ISI] arrival back in Pakistan, Gen Pasha briefed the Army Chief who ultimately discussed the matter in his one to one meeting with Mr Zardari on **15<sup>th</sup> November** instant. The COAS had impressed upon the President to call Husain Haqqani home to explain his alleged role in the said memo affair.

It was a coincidence or otherwise that the memo's hullabaloo suddenly started soon after the DG ISI's meeting with Mansoor Ijaz and a host of television shows abruptly aired and a number of articles started appearing in media.

Next day, on **16<sup>th</sup> November 2011** another top meeting was held on the issue in which PM Gilani was also present; decision to call Husain Haqqani home was taken. Till that weekend, the GHQ had sent a formal letter to the presidency to order an enquiry into the memo issue. The significance of this communication was not lost on the political leadership. *The situation went worse with the admission by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta that he too was in know of the memo.* In one of the mes-

sages exchanged between Mansoor Ijaz and Husain Haqqani, Leon Panetta was also mentioned.

On **28<sup>th</sup> October 2011** Mansoor Ijaz had written that:

*['Tell me one important thing. Who likes you and who hates you in the US establishment? Who wants you to stay and who wants to xxx you up? Husain Haqqani responded: 'The debate abt your oped has caused my detractors to put pressure on my boss.' He then sent this message - Husain Haqqani: 'In US estab, I can count on Leon and Petraeus.]*

It was then decided, that the government of Pakistan would officially contact the Blackberry Company to obtain certified data (Pin codes) and to *'spare no influence, including cessation of Blackberry services in Pakistan, were the company to act reluctant in complying with the request'*. The political and army leadership was seen determined on two things:

- The memo issue carried risks of national proportions and therefore must be thoroughly investigated and taken to its logical conclusion.
- No politics would be played or allowed to be played in deciding the matter.

### **CIVIL VS MILITARY STRIDES:**

The close circles around Mr Zardari believed the letter was being used to drive a wedge between the civilians and the military bosses. Considering Haqqani's connections in Washington, it was unclear why he would choose Mansoor Ijaz to deliver the said message. Zardari's spokesman accused Ijaz, who said he had once negotiated between the government of Sudan and the Clinton administration in 1990s successfully; **'the Guardian'** observed.

The media did not rule out the possibility of 'America's big game' behind the curtain because since the early days of Pakistan, the decisions of the next ruling regime have always been taken in Washington.

After the death of Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, when America had manoeuvred to send Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington M Ali Bogra as Pakistan's next prime minister, the Americanization of Pakistan had started and the process successfully run at least till 2007 when Benazir Bhutto was sent to Pakistan after a successful deal on NRO. None of the previous rulers like Ayub Khan, Gen Yahya Khan, Gen Ziaul Haq or

Gen Musharraf could hold the reigns of the government without America's prior approval.

Amongst the politicians; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went against the American will while opting to develop his nuclear program, but first got fired then hanged. In 1988, Gen Ziaul Haq declined to accept the American solution of Afghan issue, they got it done through PM Junejo and Geneva Accord was signed. Gen Ziaul Haq angrily fired his PM Junejo but was also sent to heavens in an air crash just after 75 days. Similarly Gen Musharraf was forced to sit on the table with Ms Bhutto [July 2007 in Emirates] and within a year was expelled from the presidency by her husband, Zardari

After Mirza Aslam Beg's departure from the Army House, all the army chiefs who headed the Pakistan Army, tried to formulate their own priorities of governance; every time new. Whenever America interfered, there has been strong reaction to that. Though there were civilian rules of PPP and the PML for ten years but the successive army chiefs always prevailed in decision making.

Gen Aslam Beg used to say openly about Benazir Bhutto that **'both husband & wife came to his drawing room to beg the rule in 1988'**. Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua always received his PM Nawaz Sharif without cap just to avoid saluting him.

Gen A Waheed Kakar was going to get extension in his tenure from the then prime minister but there was so strong reaction prevailing within GHQ that he had to seek retirement as per schedule.

Gen Jehangir Karamat was so disciplined that he generally opted to go by the constitution and respecting his civilian Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif but the later, instead of giving him reciprocal respect, considered him weak and sent him home in an un-ceremonial way. The reaction in the army escalated with the time and ultimately the same PM himself was sent to Attock Jail in October 1999.

During Gen Musharraf's tenure as Army Chief, quoting the daily **'Jang' of 20<sup>th</sup> November 2011**, the army had mounted so much pressure on Nawaz Sharif that Shahbaz Sharif and Ch Nisar Ali once had to visit the Army House to beg soft corner for the prime minister. Gen Musharraf as COAS had sent one Corps Commander of Quetta home in 1999 just because he had met PM Nawaz Sharif in private without his permission.

It was an irony of fate that during the whole decade (1990-99) of civilian rule the America used to talk directly with Pakistani Army Chiefs bypassing the political governments. Like Gen Ziaul Haq, Gen Musharraf went smooth with America in his early years of governance but when he tried to argue with his American counterparts after 2005, the US played to

bring all political parties together against Gen Musharraf with one point agenda of 'Go Musharraf Go'. All Parties Conference of Summer 2006 at London can be taken as reference, where PPP, PML(N), JUI and others were all there; participating to kick out Gen Musharraf.

PPP's later regime and Mr Zardari were in a way lucky to get America's full support against the previous practices where army used to get the focal attention but his party PPP continuously and miserably failed to exhibit good governance throughout its tenure from 2008-13. Rampant corruption in all departments & state functionaries coupled with acute nepotism in the name of '*reinstating the deprived PPP workers*' mutilated the whole economy of the country. Load shedding and energy crisis brought gradual closure of all industries and production units creating immense unemployment and inflation amidst shortage of basic food and clothing.

Docile media groups were compelled by the PPP to voice that ONE MAJOR cause of corruption by politicians in Pakistan was the fear of army control itself. In the political tenures even, the army used to control some foreign affairs of strategic nature like Pak-India relationship, Kashmir Policy, Afghan issues only and nothing beyond. Through NLC, Defence Housing Schemes, Fauji Foundation, Askri Bank etc the Army run their own welfare projects and the civil governments could follow those patterns.

However, the above fields did not constitute even a fraction of the whole executive powers. One could consider the whole set of civil secretariats and all functions of federal and four provincial governments; for instance affairs concerning with Power generation and distribution; Gas extraction and distribution; policing, NAB and FIA, all corporations like PIA, Steel Mills, Shipping & Ports, Trading Corporations, Imports & Exports, Health, Education, Production, Highways, Roads, Bridges, Banking, Taxes, Excise and Custom collection, Housing, Railways ...and countless other fields remained with the civil governments but they miserably failed to deliver.

Just to cover their corruption, nepotism and inefficiency, the civil governments were seen raising hue and cry that due to army control or interference, the political leaders did not feel safe in Pakistan and stashed their wealth abroad for their rainy days. Truth remained otherwise. What an explanation for their corrupt practices – quote any other democracy in the world doing that.

As per PPP & PML(N&Q)'s on roll media persons, it brought mass corruption as the political leaders did not know how long they would stay in power and how long they would survive. No other country in the world had their leaders fleeing for safe havens abroad. At one time leaders of all three major parties, Benazir Bhutto & Mr Zardari, the whole Sharif family



and Altaf Hussain were abroad and remained so for years. Gen Musharraf was also exiled as soon as he took off his uniform and became civilian.

Messages of the PPP [*mostly through their loyal media analysts and think tanks*] were conveyed that the Army should ponder to contain itself to its security functions, eliminate the terrorists and work under the command and control of the civilian governments. On the other hand, feeling that the political government was not delivering the required facilities and fruit to the common people, the army itself started conveying to the whole world that *'their [PPP's] civil government is corrupt and maintains no guts or acumen to guide the army as an institution'*.

The irony of fate was that the PPP government, instead of providing amenities to the people and earning good reputation by putting economic reforms and showing good governance, concentrated on non-issues like:

- That ISI should be under the control of Ministry of Interior [referred to July 2008 episodes].
- The sidelined superior judiciary should not be reinstated [referring to March 2009's developments].
- That Kerry Logar Aid should be linked with pinching clauses for the army [referred to 2009's strategic negotiations with Americans in Washington].
- Gen Durrani should be kept associated with the PPP.
- There should not be any elections in the political parties [referred to 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment].
- Jamshed Dasti, a fake degree holder MNA, was brought back in the Parliament just to make mockery of democracy and judiciary.

There was a long list of such like 'mounting' functions with the PPP.

In nut shell, PPP was contesting that democracy was being targeted. Needless to say that Pakistan has never experienced democracy after 1951; either there has been military dictatorship or civil aristocracy of a few big families.

***The unanimous vote in favour of 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment had stamped and locked the general population of Pakistan as slaves because now by constitutional provisions there cannot be elections in the political parties AND the then Chief Justice Iftikhar M Chaudhry kept mum on such basic violation of fundamental rights given in Pakistan's Constitution.***

Pakistan's next prime minister would be either Bilawal Zardari, or Moonus Elahi, or Hamza Shahbaz Sharif or Hussain Nawaz or Captain Safdar or Qasim Gilani and nobody else; let the fight be on between military & civil dictators; people would continue to be fooled in the name of democracy.

**HUSAIN HAQQANI CALLED HOME:**

Coming back to memo-gate; the original subject:

President Zardari summoned Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, to Islamabad to solve the enigma and find out some solution. However, Haqqani in an interview with a US journal refused to admit sending of the memo to any and wrote a letter to President Zardari in this regard in which he offered his resignation; Haqqani was blamed to play a key role in that issue.

Husain Haqqani was received at Islamabad on **19<sup>th</sup> November 2011** with the best possible protocol [in the name of security] as was seen during Hilary Clinton's state visit to Pakistan. Haqqani was also considered as **the US Ambassador in United States** looking after the US-Pak relations desk and giving performance suitable for and acceptable to both the countries. The US government could not go angry with Mr Zardari because they were not feeling easy with Gen Kayani.

President Zardari had successfully delivered all those materials needed or wished by the US ranging from Raymond Davis to Osama's alleged killing; much more than they were having during Gen Musharraf's regime. The US was finding Pak Army at a distance because despite numerous open and covert threats, Gen Kayani had not bothered to move a single troop against alleged anti-American network at Pak-Afghan borders. See one media comment:

*'Husain Haqqani is also a CIA man and he does not need another CIA guy to contact US administration or give a written memo. He can easily discuss this issue in person as he is doing now with Grossman. This whole thing is a game by CIA to expose its moles in Pakistan who have become useless to them.'*

Husain Haqqani claimed that allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz were baseless but at the same time offered to resign over the scandal. Hours after Haqqani offered to resign, the representative of Mike Mullen, Captain John Carbie, while talking to an **American journal 'Foreign Policy'**, told that Mike Mullen recalled his memory and had investigated from the concerned people and confirmed that he was given a copy of the secret memo but he had not concentrated on it considering it 'not trustable'.

South Asian News Agency [SANA] also confirmed the same version **on 18<sup>th</sup> November 2011**. Previously the Admiral had denied remembering the receiving of any such letter.

PPP's stalwarts held that if Mansoor Ijaz's version was correct then one should also believe in his allegations against ISI. He constantly used to write against Pakistan Military and ISI to please his American masters. If Mansoor Ijaz claimed and Mullan admitted, it might be a case of fabrication; a thorough investigation must be conducted to unveil the facts.

In present day diplomacy, the dodgy attitudes, lolls and compromises are considered the cannons of success. The issue of the subject memo was once raised before the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton when she was on Pakistan's tour in late 2011 but she had denied its existence. She had told that **'it is not possible that if Mike Mullen gets such an important reference and he would not bring it in the notice of White House team.'**

When Mullen was in service, he had refused to acknowledge its receipt; when he was retired he recalled its admission. No where in the world, neither in military nor in civil departments, a retired officer is given access to the official records, not at all. The question arises that what was the sudden necessity to blow air into that dead balloon after five months; nothing but to widen the gulf between political and military leadership of Pakistan; a well smart move from America, isn't it.

The contents of the said letter comprised of material against the army chief and ISI which echoed in the National Assembly as Mr Zardari was made target of severe criticism by opposition. The issue not only turned into a hot topic in the parliament and political circles but also created rift between the government and army.

In fact, Husain Haqqani had once again proved that he was an American loyalist; more loyal to the US than Pakistan. He had earlier inserted anti-military clauses in the Kerry Lugar Bill. Even the media considered him a traitor of Pakistan by his deeds and actions.

The above memo indicated at least one thing that Pakistani politicians always sought aid from the US to help them out when they feared of losing their power. Benazir Bhutto did so, Nawaz Sharif did so, Gen Musharraf did it and then Zaradri was also sailing in the same boat. No ruler had ever shown respect for nationalism and rule of law.

### **SUPREME COURT MOVED:**

A petition was filed in the Supreme Court (SC) on **19<sup>th</sup> November 2011** requesting it to constitute a judicial commission to investigate the authenticity of the said secret memo raising questions against Pakistani armed forces. The petition was filed in the SC Lahore registry by one Hashim Shaukat Khan (President of the Watan Party) and Barrister Zafar Ullah Khan. The petition said that:

*'Mansoor Ijaz is a US national who acted as an agent for Americans, and that the memo seems like an attempt to create differences between various institutions of Pakistan trying to label them as corrupt and unreliable. Thus it becomes necessary to investigate the issue as it targets the Pakistan army and may lead to further tensions in the civil-military relationship in the country.'*

Simultaneously, Nawaz Sharif of the PML(N) and others invoked original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by means of Constitutional Petitions which all were taken up for hearing on 1st December 2011. The petitioners were heard, notices issued and to conduct a probe into the Memo, Mr Tariq Khosa [former DG FIA] was approached to act as Commission.

On the same day, by means of press conference held in PID office by Babar Awan along with two other ministers, the order of the apex court was criticized contemptuously. Mr Tariq Khosa declined to act as Commission because his brother Justice Asif Saeed Khosa of the same SC was being criticized un-necessarily though was not member of the concerned Bench.

*[The SC bench comprised of CJP Iftikhar M Chaudhry, J Mian Shakirullah Jan, J Tassaduq Hussain Jilani, J Jawwad S Khawaja, J Tariq Pervez, J Mian Saqib Nisar, J Ejaz Afzal Khan, J Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry and J Ather Saeed.]*

Concerned parties, including the Chief of Army Staff, DG ISI, Mansoor Ijaz as well as Husain Haqqani and the Federation of Pakistan filed their replies. No separate reply was filed by Mr Zardari being the President of Pakistan though was also issued a notice.

The apex court reached the conclusion that the said Memo existed. Earlier on **16<sup>th</sup> November 2011** Husain Haqqani had addressed a letter to the President of Pakistan wherein after giving his side of story; he desired to tender his resignation from the post of Ambassador of Pakistan in United States and himself expressed for probe into the matter. A series of meetings were held between the Prime Minister, Chief of Army Staff, DG ISI and the President thereafter; Husain Haqqani tendered his resignation on **22<sup>nd</sup> November 2011**, which was accepted next day.

Husain Haqqani categorically denied his role in the memo and also relied upon an affidavit tendered by Gen James Jones, to establish that Mansoor Ijaz had concocted that story.

[Gen James Jones in his affidavit had given that he did not recall whether Mr Ijaz claimed that Ambassador Haqqani had anything to do with the creation of the memo. He had no reason to believe that Ambassador Haqqani had any role in the creation of the memo, nor that he had any prior knowledge of the memo.

On the other hand, in his affidavit before the court, Mansoor Ijaz directly disputed Jones' account of events saying that he did tell Jones about Haqqani's involvement during their 9<sup>th</sup> May phone call. Mansoor's affidavit mentioned that:

*'I made clear to him near the end of the call that Pakistan's ambassador to the US was the originator of the message. He responded by saying he would do it if the message would be in writing.'*

In the meanwhile **on 28<sup>th</sup> November 2011**, PM Gilani referred the matter to the Parliamentary Committee to conduct probe on the subject issue. Mansoor Ijaz in his reply and in counter affidavit contradicted the stand taken by Husain Haqqani.

Interestingly Haqqani had lost [*or managed it to be lost*] his black berries. Secondly; RIMS did not share its data with Pakistan as it needed a request from the concerned parties, Haqqani and Mansoor Ijaz in this case. As Haqqani was the defendant, he should have requested RIMS to provide data to prove his innocence but he did not.

**"STATE WITHIN STATE" – PM GILANI:**

After 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2011's Abbotabad episode the power game in Pakistan got momentum. Though the US spokesmen repeatedly told the world media that the Pakistan army or the ISI did not have any knowledge about Osama's stay in the country but they believed that Osama was in the shelter of the 'Establishment'. The Americans started tightening screws around the Pak Army knowingly that still they badly needed Pakistan in Afghan war. They resorted to their tested tactics of carrots and stick; stopped all dollar and arms supply to Pakistan followed by covert threats of 'sanctions'.

The Pak Army firmly believed that Osama was pointed out by some one from the Presidency thus they picked up the thread of Memo-gate to eliminate the source through judiciary. PPP's legal minds had identified certain contradictions in Mansoor Ijaz and James Jones affidavits; thus the Memo-gate case lost its credibility.

Towards ending 2011, PPP's stalwarts had reached the conclusion that the Establishment wanted PPP government no more and Zardari could be ousted. PM Gilani brought himself forward as the major political martyr by giving open and fiery speeches to defy the Supreme Court orders and criticizing the Pak-Army. PM Gilani's speech at the Parliament's floor on **22<sup>nd</sup> December 2011** is referred.

***'We are being asked by the Judicial [Abbotabad] Commission about issuance of visas (to Americans); but I want to ask how Osama bin Laden lived here for the past six years? On what type of visa was he living here?'***

PM Gilani had roared. The army had to make an immediate announcement that ***'there would be no military take over'***; the dust of Memo Case appeared to be settled temporarily at least.

Referring to the Ministry of Defense MOD's reply of a day earlier, **21<sup>st</sup> December 2011**, to the Supreme Court, which had suggested that the army and the ISI were not under its control, the PM Gilani had said that:

***'There can't be a state within the state; [and that] they [the establishment] would always be answerable to the Parliament.'***

***All institutions of the country are answerable to the parliament and that it was the civilian government which had put its full weight behind the establishment after the 2<sup>nd</sup> May's raid in Abbotabad or after the Salala raid of 26<sup>th</sup> November [2011]. For that, he feels, it is getting a very raw deal.'***

Referring to one media source report of **23<sup>rd</sup> December 2011**, in the aftermath of Memo-gate issue, the ISI officials [of brigadier rank] shuttled back and forth to take the PML(N) on board. They held detailed sessions with three key leaders of the PML(N), days before SC started hearing on Memo-gate case, during two nights between 27-29<sup>th</sup> November; the first one in Islamabad and the second one in Murree. Allegedly Senator Ishaq Dar of the PML(N) had been one of the three interlocutors in those late November meetings.

The opposition party was given blueprints of a possible scenario pushing out President Zardari & an 'emergency plus' situation, with a pledge of holding fresh polls within three months. One of the ISI's high rank officers tried to contact a top judicial officer during the same period; succeeded or not, was not confirmed. PML(N)'s secret contacts with the security establishment were denied by their spokesperson Mushahidullah Khan; mildly terming it as 'misconception' but saying next moment that ***'who isn't fed up with Zardari?'***